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Possession and Control of Drugs in Pennsylvania:
What is it?
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of drug prosecutions at the county level of the
judicial system is now filtering upward to the Commonwealth's appel-
late courts. It was not until January 1971, that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court first considered the section of the Drug, Device, and
Cosmetic Act' which prohibits the possession or control of dangerous
or narcotic drugs.2 Following this decision the superior court rendered
two opinions which exclusively relied on the rationale developed by
the supreme court. Prior to these decisions there was no judicial
guidance as to what quantum of evidence was sufficient to convict for
possession of drugs. The collective result of these rulings has been the
emergence of a limited definition and interpretation of the Act.
These decisions have only partially defined the boundaries of what
is possession or control of dangerous drugs. Many problems remain
unconsidered and unanswered. The purpose of this comment is to
analyze these problems, and to suggest possible interpretations of the
Act that will resolve them. A four step analysis is used to define and
resolve these unanswered questions. First, an examination is made of
the Pennsylvania decisions alluded to above. From these decisions, a
tentative definition of the term possession is constructed and compared
to definitions devised in other jurisdictions. Then, the specific prob-
lems to be considered are listed; examples are provided for clarification
and illustration.
At this point the direction of the inquiry turns to other jurisdictions
and their resolution of these questions. A detailed review of the reason-
ing used in these jurisdictions is undertaken; their reasoning is com-
pared and contrasted to the developing Pennsylvania doctrine. Finally,
an examination is made of how courts in other jurisdictions have re-
solved the issue of guilt in common factual settings under which drugs
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780 et seq. (1961) [hereinafter cited as Act].
2. Id. § 780-4: "The following acts . . . are hereby prohibited: (q) The possession,
control, dealing in, dispensing, selling, delivery, distribution, prescription, trafficking in,
or giving of, any dangerous or narcotic drug . [..." All further references to the Act will
refer exclusively to the "possession and control" phrase in subsection (q) unless otherwise
noted.]
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are found so that Pennsylvania courts and attorneys will have some
guidance when they are faced with similar circumstances.
THE EMERGING PENNSYLVANIA CONCEPT
In Commonwealth v. Tirpak,3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
first considered what circumstances gave rise to an inference of posses-
sion or control of dangerous drugs. In Tirpak, the court reversed, with-
out dissent, a superior court decision4 which held that an inference of
possession or control of marijuana was reasonable when a jar of the
drug was found within eight feet of the four appellants; when there
were still warm marijuana cigarettes in an ashtray; and when the
owner of the house pled guilty to possession. The court held the mere
fact the appellants had the opportunity to commit or join in possession
or control of the marijuana was insufficient to prove them guilty of
possession or control where no marijuana was found on their person.
Citing Tirpak as its sole authority, the superior court reversed two
marijuana possession convictions. In Commonwealth v. La Rosa5 no
marijuana was found on the appellant's person, but several packets of
the drug were discovered in a cabin occupied by the appellant and
eight others. Also, a packet containing marijuana residue was found
on the front porch of the cabin with the name Joe written on it. The
appellant's name was Joe. In Commonwealth v. Schuloff,6 an apart-
ment rented by the appellant as a co-lessee was searched at night pur-
suant to a warrant, while Schuloff and three others were asleep in their
bedrooms. Marijuana was found hidden in a couch in the living room,
but no one admitted to owning it.
An examination of Tirpak and the two superior court decisions in-
dicates what general circumstances will not support a possession con-
viction. Showing that a person is present when drugs are being used or
where they are being stored, without more, cannot sustain a possession
conviction. This is especially true where, as in the three cases cited, the
accused does not have exclusive access to, or is not in sole occupancy of,
the place where the crime is being committed.
In Commonwealth v. Dasch,7 the court reversed a possession con-
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3. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
4. Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 216 Pa. Super. 310, 263 A.2d 917 (1970).
5. 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275 A.2d 693 (1971).
6. 218 Pa. Super. 209, 275 A.2d 835 (1971).
7. 218 Pa. Super. 43, 269 A.2d 359 (1970).
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viction where scraps' of marijuana were found mixed with debris on
the floor of a car driven by the appellant and owned by his mother. In
reversing the conviction the court emphasized two points: the com-
monwealth bore the burden of proof to show that the appellant knew
there was marijuana in the car; and that it was difficult to conceive of
anyone possessing or controlling the marijuana scraps swept from the
car as there was no evidence that the appellant knew of its presence.
Any number of intervening circumstances could have been responsible
for the presence of the marijuana scraps in the car.9 An inference of
possession, control and knowledge from these facts could only be based
on conjecture and suspicion, and not on evidence sufficient to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.10
A possession test based on the four Pennsylvania cases outlined above
may be stated as follows: The proximity to drugs, the presence on
property where drugs are located, or the association with people who
do control drugs or the property on which they are found is not
sufficient, absent other circumstances, to support a finding of posses-
sion." To state the test more succinctly, the mere presence at the scene
of a crime (a violation of the Act), without more, is not sufficient to
justify a finding of guilt.12
THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Conspicuously absent in Pennsylvania case law is a clear statement
by the courts as to what are the elements of the crime of possession or
control of drugs. Because these elements have not been listed the
courts have not defined them, nor have they considered what factual
situations would support an inference as to the existence of one or
more of these elements.
Another question not ruled upon by the Pennsylvania appellate
courts is whether traces of a drug would be sufficient evidence to con-
vict for possession. Would the existence of an unusable amount of
marijuana in a defendant's pocket, a burnt residue in a pipe, or a
chemical trace of heroin in a syringe be sufficient evidence to support
a possession conviction?
8. See note 35.
9. 218 Pa. Super. 43, 48, 269 A.2d 359, 362.
10. Id.
11. See Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1962).
12. Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 427, 263 A.2d 463, 466 (1970).
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Nor, have the courts considered whether the quantum of proof
necessary to prove possession would change if drugs were discovered
in an automobile, as opposed to a dwelling, as was the case in Tirpak,
Schuloff, and La Rosa. To phrase the issue more broadly: what other
circumstances would be necessary to support a finding of possession or
control?
Other problems not yet considered by the Pennsylvania courts would
include the case of a conspirator who is to be tried for the possession of
drugs which were found on the person of a co-conspirator; the criminal
liability of a third party who brought a potential buyer and seller of
drugs together, but who was not otherwise involved in the transaction.
Similarly, what if the accused only momentarily possessed drugs as he
would if he were to take a puff from a pipe of marijuana being passed
among a group of people, or what if the accused is the addressee of an
intercepted package of drugs? Under what circumstances may the
people in these situations be convicted for possession or control of
drugs?
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
While the Pennsylvania courts have not specifically stated what
constitutes possession and control, they have apparently adopted the
test used in the federal courts' 3 and a majority of the state courts.14
This test is set forth in People v. Groom'5 and catalogs the elements in
a three point list: (1) it must be shown that the accused exercised do-
minion and control over the drug; (2) that he had knowledge of its
physical presence; and (3) that he had knowledge 6 of its narcotic na-
ture.
Control
The first element of the test, control, presents no difficulties since,
unlike the California' 7 and federal' statutes, the Pennsylvania legis-
13. Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1962). The court did not list
the elements, but it did specifically refer to "control and knowledge," those elements sug-
gested in the text of this paper.
14. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 821 (1963) for an extensive listing of those states that
require the elements suggested in the text.
15. 60 Cal. 2d 694, 696, 388 P.2d 359, 361 (1964).
16. Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 826 (1963) cites Boric v. Florida, 79 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1955)
as being representative of a state court decision that does not require the scienter of
knowledge. As evidence of the rapidly changing state of the law as to drug violations it
should be noted this decision was reversed in Frank v. Florida, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1967).
17. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11530 (West 1971).
479
Duquesne Law Review
lature directly incorporated this element into the language of the
Act. Control is a mandated part of the Pennsylvania possession concept.
Knowledge
Difficulty arises as to the element of knowledge as defined in parts
two and three of the test. Courts, 19 other than Pennsylvania, have held
that an accused cannot be convicted for possession unless a showing is
made that he knew of the drug's presence and of its narcotic nature.
Conversely, the court has not stated that proof of possession, without a
showing of knowledge, is sufficient to support a conviction.
The superior court has ruled both ways on this issue. The court
in Dasch and Commonwealth v. Yaple20 (both decided on the same
day) directly contradicted itself. In Yaple the court stated that knowl-
edge was not an essential element of the offense,2 1 yet in Dasch the
court stated knowledge was an ingredient of the offense. 22
As noted above, the majority of states have ruled that knowledge is
an element of the crime of possession. This is the better rule as the
rationale behind malum prohibitum crimes (those crimes that do
not require proof of knowledge or intent to obtain a conviction) is
not present in drug possession cases. The penalties for violating the
Act, unlike those provided for malum prohibitum violations, are not
relatively small.23 Long jail sentences and heavy fines are expressly
provided for in the Act, especially for repeated violations. A conviction
for a violation of the Act is a felony, and unlike a conviction for a
violation of a malum prohibitum statute, a felony conviction does
grave damage to an offender's reputation.2 4 A felon has difficulty in get-
ting a job, he cannot own a gun, he cannot leave the country without
registering; nor may he serve on juries, run for office, or vote.2 5 The
Act, unlike a malum prohibitum statute, is not a mere regulatory
18. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1970); Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir.
1962) states that, "this interpretation of the statute equating 'possession with . . . control
... has been adopted by other circuits ......
19. Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 821 (1963).
20. 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970).
21. Id. at 242-43, 273 A.2d at 351.
22. The court explained its holding in Yaple by stating that knowledge of the drug's
narcotic nature was not an element of the offense, Commonwealth v. Bready, 220 Pa. Super.
157, 160 n.2, 286 A.2d 654, 656 n.2 (1971). Knowledge of the drug's presence, as required by
Dasch, apparently is an element of the offense.
23. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
24. Morissette v. United States, 242 U.S. 246 (1952).
25. See generally Note, The Legal Status of Convicts During and After Incarceration,
37 VA. L. REv. 105 (1951).
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enactment; 26 the offense is not a violation of an affirmative duty of
care27 as is provided for in the typical malum prohibitum statute.
It is difficult to divide malum in se acts (acts wrong in themselves;
common law offenses such as murder, larceny, etc.) from malum pro-
hibitum acts;28 the courts should not improvise presumptions of
knowledge or intent which conflict with the overriding presumption of
innocence. 29 Even the legislative power to facilitate convictions by
substituting presumptions for proof is not without limit.3 0 The differ-
ences between the Act and the typical malum prohibitum regulation
are vast. The inference of knowledge as to the latter is not justified as
to the former.
Having discussed the elements of the crime of possession, a general
definition of the term may be stated as follows: possession is to have
something in one's power; actual possession exists when the drugs are
in the immediate possession or control of the party while constructive
possession exists when there is no actual dominion over the drugs, but
where there is an intent and capability to maintain control and domin-
ion.31 Proof of possession may be shown by the use of either direct or
circumstantial evidence;3 2 proof of exclusive control is strong circum-
stantial evidence tending to show knowledge of the presence and nature
of any drugs found.83
Quantity
May possession be found when the amount of the drug involved is
not a usable amount, but rather is only a minute quantity or chemical
trace? No case on point has been decided by the Pennsylvania appel-
late courts.3 4 However, the decisions in Dasch and La Rosa indicate
that a usable 5 amount is required to sustain a conviction.
26. Clem's Cafe Liquor License Case, 425 Pa. 94, 100, 227 A.2d 491, 494 (1967).
27. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952).
28. Clem's Cafe Liquor icense Case, 425 Pa. 94, 100, 227 A.2d 491, 494 (1967).
29. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
30. Id.
31. Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
889 (1961); People v. Mermuys, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 1089, 82 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1969).
32. Id.
33. Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1962) citing Evans v. United
States, 257 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958).
34. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 7 Adams L.J. 24 (1965) wherein the court held that any
quantity was sufficient to support a conviction.
35. The courts have not empirically defined what quantity of a drug would qualify as
a trace, scrap, residue, or an unusable amount. These terms are used interchangeably in
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In Dasch the court stated it was difficult to conceive of anyone hav-
ing possession of scraps of marijuana found on the floor of the car, and
that it was even more difficult to conceive of anyone controlling them.
It is submitted that this holding, and the decision in La Rosa, may be
used to support the proposition that one may not be convicted for
possession of drugs where the amount involved is too small to be used
or sold.
In La Rosa two separate units of drugs were involved; those
found in the cabin with eight other persons present, and the residue
of marijuana found in an envelope with the appellant's name on it.
As to the usable quantity of drugs in the cabin, Tirpak obviously
controlled. Tirpak did not so clearly control as to the residue in the
envelope. It is submitted the court did not convict the appellant for
possessing the marijuana in the envelope because the quantity was (as
in Dasch) an unusable amount; a quantity too small to be used or sold.
Support for this contention is found in other jurisdictions. 6 These
courts, as well as the Pennsylvania courts, have stated the principle
reason for prohibiting the possession of drugs is that their use is offen-
sive to society because of the deleterious effect they have on the user.3 7
Therefore, if the amount of drugs involved is so small that it cannot
be used or sold, it cannot cause the harm which gives society the right
to penalize its sale or possession.38 Common sense dictates that an
unusable quantity of drugs is not what the legislature intended to
prohibit when it outlawed the possession of drugs because of their
danger to the user or to society.3 9 Accordingly, it is submitted that no
possession conviction should be permitted if the amount of the drug
involved is not usable.
Middlemen
May a person who brings a willing buyer and seller of drugs together
be convicted for possession? The federal courts have held that a casual
this paper and refer to any quantity of a drug that would be insufficient to cause any
effect on the user. This is the view adopted by the California courts.
36. State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962); People v. Leal, 64 Cal. 2d 504,
413 P.2d 665 (1966); Michens v. People, 148 Colo. 1237, 365 P.2d 679 (1961); Edelin v.
United States, 227 A.2d 395 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967); People v. Pippen, 16 App. Div. 2d 635,
227 N.Y.S.2d 1964 (1962); Pelham v. State, 16 Tex. Crim. App. 377, 298 S.W.2d 171 (1957).
See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 829 (1963).
37. Commonwealth v. Garrick, 210 Pa. Super. 124, 232 A.2d 8 (1967).
38. People v. Leal, 64 Cal. 2d 504, 511, 413 P.2d 665, 670 (1966).
39. Id.
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facilitator of a sale who knows that a given principal possesses and trades
in narcotics, but who lacks a working relationship with the principal
that would enable him to assure delivery, may not be said to have
possession of any drugs sold.40 The situation exemplified by this rule is
when X, an undercover narcotics agent, asks Y if he can sell him some
drugs. Y replies that he does not sell drugs but that Z might be able
to accommodate him. Y introduces X to Z and waits until the trans-
action is over. Y does not receive any money from Z, nor does he
promise X that Z will be able or willing to sell him drugs. 41
Lucero v. United States42 illustrates the functioning of this rule. In
Lucero the appellant's guilt as to the transaction which was the subject
of the first count of the indictment was affirmed because the appellant
was the moving party in the transaction. He vouched for the quality
of the heroin, set the price, and assured delivery (he did not make the
actual delivery). However, as to the second transaction, the court re-
versed the appellant's conviction because the evidence only showed that
he was in the vicinity of the sale and that he drove the seller away after
the transaction.
Conspiracy
Possession by a co-conspirator is not, by itself, sufficient to sustain a
possession conviction as to the other conspirators. 4 Actual or construc-
tive possession must be shown as to each conspirator. 44 If a defendant-
conspirator could be convicted of possession of drugs which were in the
hands of a co-conspirator, the statutory term possession would include
possession by persons over whom the defendant had no control; or of
whose existence he may have been totally unaware; or of whose identity
he may not have known.45 If such a construction of the term possession
were permitted, the burden upon the defendant would be difficult if
not impossible to discharge.46
40. United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1962); similarly, the middleman may
not be convicted for sale of drugs. See United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955);
United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1959).
41. United States v. Camarillo, 431 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1970) is the prototype for this
illustration.
42. 311 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1964).
43. Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1962).
44. Id. at 123.
45. Id. at 122.
46. Id.
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Momentary Possession
In Yaple the superior court asserted that the duration of possession
was immaterial citing Maryland and Texas decisions as authority. Other
jurisdictions do not follow this formulation of the law. In Eckroth v.
Florida.47 the court held that taking a puff from a pipe filled with
marijuana and passing it to another was "a mere 'passing control,
fleeting and shadowy in its nature,' "48 and could not sustain a posses-
sion conviction.
The court reached this conclusion by noting that if a flask of liquor
were substituted for the passing pipe, a conviction for the unlawful
possession of liquor could not be obtained. Pennsylvania has adopted
this same rule of law as to the possession of a bottle of liquor,49 and it
is therefore submitted that the Pennsylvania courts should rule that
a possession conviction cannot be obtained when there is a momentary
possession of a pipe or cigarette containing marijuana. 50
This analogy is best suited to the passing of a pipe or cigarette because
a drug user does not share a syringe or bottle of pills in the same way
as he does a bottle of liquor or pipe of marijuana. A further point in
favor of this analogy is the generally accepted fact that the unlawful
possession of marijuana is more equivalent to the abuse of alcohol than
it is to the use of hard or addicting drugs.5'
Receipt of Mailed Drugs
There exists little authority to guide the courts in determining what
circumstances would be sufficient to convict the addressee of a package
containing drugs when they are shipped and intercepted in the mail.
A recent Illinois decision held that an addressee who simply followed
up a post office notification to claim a package (addressed to another,
but mailed in care of the addressee) could not be convicted for pos-
session.52
47. 227 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1969).
48. Id. at 316.
49. Commonwealth v. Benson, 105 Pa. Super. 123, 160 A. 243 (1932).
50. Some federal courts have adopted the view that possession does not include the
momentary grasping of drugs. See, Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114, 118 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1962).
51. In People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that the consequences of marijuana abuse were not comparable to hard
drug use. Accordingly, the court held that a statute which required the same penalty for
the sale of marijuana as for the sale of hard drugs was in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
52. People v. Ackerman, 274 N.E.2d 125 (Appellate Court of Ill., 3d Dist. 1971).
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In Commonwealth v. Chester-Standard,5 3 the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas, sitting en banc, granted the defendant's mo-
tion in arrest of judgment where his conviction was based solely on a
package of marijuana which was removed from the mail before the
defendant received it. The court, citing La Rosa as its sole authority,
stated the motion was granted "for the reason that the Commonwealth
had failed to prove actual possession on the part of the defendant."'
Using these decisions as a guide it appears that certain criteria must
be met before a defendant may be convicted for possession of mailed
drugs. First, it must be proven the accused actually took physical pos-
session of the package; it must then be shown that he opened the pack-
age and gained knowledge of the presence and narcotic nature of the
drugs; and that he then exercised sufficient control over the drugs to
indicate an intent to retain them. At this point, the elements required
to prove possession would be present, and a conviction could be ob-
tained.
Projections from Tirpak, Schuloff, Dasch, and La Rosa
As the Pennsylvania appellate courts have not, as yet, considered any
possession cases in light of the rationale developed in Tirpak, Schuloff,
Dasch, and La Rosa there exists little guidance as to what circumstances
will support a finding of possession. To aid attorneys and the courts in
determining what common factual settings in which drugs may be
found will be sufficient to sustain a possession conviction, a summary
and analysis of decisions from other jurisdictions is outlined below. In
considering these decisions a distinction is made between cases involv-
ing automobiles and dwellings. This is done, not because the principles
change with geography, but because the split facilitates the presentation.
As discussed above, an essential element of the offense is the knowing
possession of drugs, and as was stated in Tirpak proof of possession can-
not be based on guilt by association, suspicion, or conjecture. In each of
the following situations the court reversed the appellant's conviction
because proof of knowing possession was not shown. The courts held
53. No. 5340 (C.P. Allegheny County, July 2, 1971). See also Commonwealth v. McCray,
No. 3995 (C.P. Allegheny County, 1971) where a motion in arrest of judgment was granted
discharging defendant from a charge of possession of marijuana. Although a packet of
marijuana was found in defendant's apartment, the evidence failed to show he was aware
the package had been delivered or that he had the opportunity to have possession or
control of the marijuana.
54. Id. at 2.
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that the convictions were based on inference, suspicion, and conjecture
-not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a suspect is a passenger in a car which has narcotics
concealed in it, cannot by itself, support a finding of possession. Courts
have refused to convict a passenger when drugs were concealed under
the back seat, 55 in the spare tire,5 6 in the camper portion of a minibus,57
or in a bag lying on the front seat floor. 58 Nor is the fact the passenger
is under the influence of drugs sufficient evidence to convict him for
the possession of drugs found in the car.59 Similarly, the fact a suspect
is sitting alone in another's parked car in which narcotics are concealed
is insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.60
Nor may it be inferred that the driver or owner of a car automatically
has knowledge of any drugs present in the car.61 In People v. Van
Soyc,6 several marijuana cigarettes were discovered intermingled with
regular cigarettes in a cigarette package which was on the dashboard of
Van Soyc's car. Also, two loose marijuana cigarettes were found near
the cigarette pack. Van Soyc and his two companions denied owner-
ship of the drugs. The court, in reversing sentence, held that Van Soyc's
presence at the scene of the crime was not sufficient evidence to support
an inference of guilty knowledge.
Courts have been reluctant to find possession and control of drugs
in circumstances where more than mere presence in a car in which
drugs are concealed is shown. In Davis v. United States,63 drugs were
discovered hidden under the cool cushion of a police car several hours
after Davis had been detained in it. The conviction was reversed as there
was no evidence that the drugs had not been concealed there either
before or after Davis' occupancy of the car. In People v. Foster,'4 a
packet of heroin was thrown by the passenger sitting by the right front
car window, however, before the car was brought to a stop the passengers
had all switched positions and the police could not determine who was
the original passenger by the window. All three suspects denied throw-
ing the packet. In both these cases, the courts stated there was no
55. United States v. Bonds, 435 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970); Bettis v. United States, 408
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1969).
56. Gonzales v. United States, 301 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962).
57. Montoya v. United States, 402 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1968), cited with approval in
Commonwealth v. Whittner, 444 Pa. 556, 281 A.2d 870 (1971).
58. People v. Williams, 5 Cal. 3d 211, 485 P.2d 1146 (1971).
59. People v. Boddie, 274 Cal. App. 2d 408, 80 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1969).
60. People v. Williams, 5 Cal. 3d 211, 485 P.2d 1146 (1971).
61. See Commonwealth v. Dasch, 218 Pa. Super. 43, 269 A.2d 359 (1970).
62. 269 Cal. App. 2d 370, 75 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1969).
63. 382 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1967).
64. 115 Cal. App. 2d 866, 253 P.2d 50 (1953).
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showing of possession; they stated that to sustain the convictions would
be permitting guilt to be based on surmise and conjecture.
To establish possession by an occupant of a car it must be proven that
his presence in the car had some relationship to the presence of the
drugs. 65 That is, it must be shown, by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, he knew of the presence of the drugs and that he exercised
control over them. This showing may be made by some conduct, utter-
ance, relationship between the parties, attitude or circumstance; but
the evidence must be very clear to satisfy the test of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.86
The above are examples of the Tirpak rationale being applied to
factual settings not yet encountered by the Pennsylvania appellate
courts. These decisions are presented as a guide to aid in determining
what facts will support a finding of possession when drugs are discovered
in similar settings in Pennsylvania.
Tirpak, La Rosa, and Schuloff concern only a few of the many com-
binations of circumstances under which drugs may be found in dwell-
ings, but these cases illustrate the features common to most possession
cases where the accused is not convicted. These features are that the
accused did not have exclusive access to drugs that were openly present,
nor did he have exclusive access to the places where drugs were con-
cealed. The Pennsylvania courts in reversing the appellants' convictions
noted that any one of several people could have possessed the drugs, i.e.,
there was no evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt who actually
did possess them. The courts in the cases listed below used this same
rationale; their decisions should offer guidance to the Pennsylvania
courts when they consider analogous circumstances.
When the accused has exclusive control or access to the place where
drugs are discovered, a strong inference supporting a finding of posses-
sion is raised. 67 For example, when drugs are found in the accused's
unshared bedroom,68 or in a dresser drawer used exclusively by one of
two roommates, 69 a conviction for possession may be obtained.
65. Bettis v. United States, 408 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1968). People v. Tharp, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 268, 78 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1969) illustrates this principle. Marijuana was discovered
in a suitcase which contained a razor, after-shave lotion and men's clothing. The appel-
lant's conviction was affirmed as he was the only male passenger in the car.
66. Bettis v. United States, 408 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1969). In Arellanes v. United
States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1962) such a showing was made as to the driver of the car
as he rented and operated it.
67. Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1962).
68. People v. Bustamante, 16 Cal. App. 3d 213, 94 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1971).
69. Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1965).
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Where, however, the accused is not in exclusive possession of the
premises it may not be inferred that he had knowledge of the presence
of drugs and control over themj 0 Thus, when a small quantity of
marijuana is found in a nightstand in a married couple's bedroom,71
or when a small quantity of marijuana is discovered within the reach of
both the lessee of an apartment and his guest,72 a conviction cannot
stand. In these circumstances the trier of fact could only speculate as
to who had knowing possession and control of the drugs.
Similarly, a possession conviction has not been permitted when mari-
juana was found between the mattress and box-spring of one of two beds
in a shared room,73 when drugs were found in a motel room rented by
one person but shared by two, 74 when marijuana was found in a closet
containing both male and female clothes75 (co-defendant had been
living there for three months), or when drugs were discovered while
the appellant was in an acquaintance's apartment where he had spent
the night,76 or had spent several days. 7
The courts, alluding to insufficient evidence, have been reluctant
to find possession in circumstances from which a stronger inference of
possession could be raised. In People v. Antistat7 8 the police, in the
appellant's absence, raided his apartment and found a visitor in the
apartment using marijuana. They also discovered marijuana concealed
in storage places which the appellant claimed he never used. The evi-
dence indicated that the appellant customarily left his key under his
doormat so that friends could enter the apartment in his absence. The
court held that the evidence was insufficient to show knowledge and
hence possession of the marijuana.
In People v. Evans79 the police discovered narcotics stuck under a
bar with chewing gum at the place where the appellant had been sit-
70. Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1958); see also Commonwealth v.
Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971).
71. Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1964). The courts have no difficulty
in finding joint possession when large quantities of marijuana are found. In People v.
Harrington, 2 Cal. 3d 991, 471 P.2d 961 (1970) the appellants' (husband and wife) con-
viction was affirmed when two pounds of marijuana was found in their apartment.
72. Cass v. United States, 361 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1966). In discussing joint control, the
court at page 411 stated that it was ridiculous to conceive of two or more people having
joint control over the small quantity of marijuana involved (1/5 ounce plus one
marijuana cigarette). The court stated it would be pure speculation as to whether the
defendant singly or jointly possessed the narcotics.
73. Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1967).
74. Kirtley v. State, 245 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1971).
75. People v. Monson, 255 Cal. App. 2d 689, 63 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1967).
76. People v. Tabizan, 166 Cal. App. 2d 271, 332 P.2d 697 (1958).
77. Torres v. State, 253 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1971).
78. 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P.2d 177 (1954).
79. 72 111. App. 2d 146, 218 N.E.2d 781 (1966).
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ting when they entered. As there was no evidence to show that the
appellant had placed the drugs under the bar the court held the evi-
dence to be insufficient to prove constructive possession.
In Williams v. United States,80 the appellant was overheard discuss-
ing entering into a future sale of marijuana to a third party. Marijuana
was subsequently discovered in a trash can near the cafe where the
conversation took place. His conviction was reversed because all that
the evidence showed was a willingness to sell in the future, and this
fell short of proving present possession.81
As may be seen in the above examples the courts required clear
and convincing proof as to who possessed the marijuana, especially if
the quantity involved was small. The courts were reluctant to convict
when the accused did not have exclusive possession of the marijuana,
nor were they anxious to find joint possession if the quantity involved
was small. It is hoped that these decisions will offer some guidance in
determining whether an accused has possession or control of drugs,
especially when small amounts of marijuana are involved.
CONCLUSION
The courts are beginning to realize the concept of possession is a
highly ambiguous one; s2 and that no sharp line can be drawn to dis-
tinguish those congeries of facts which would or would not constitute
sufficient evidence to convict for possession of drugs.8 3 Factors which
exert some effect on the courts' determination as to whether there is
possession are the quantity and nature of drug involved. This can be
seen from the holdings in Tirpak, La Rosa, and Schulofj wherein the
facts showed that the only drug involved was marijuana for personal
use. Similarly, most of the cases cited above involve small quantities
of drugs (especially marijuana) for personal use.
More importantly, it is suggested that the court's use of a stringent
possession standard in marijuana cases is a tacit recognition of its social
acceptability and widespread use, especially among the young. It is a
generally accepted fact that marijuana may be found in any social set-
ting where alcohol may be consumed, and as with alcohol, not all people
80. 290 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1961).
81. Other cases in which possession was not found: United States v. Ramos, 282 F. Supp.
354 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); People v. Hunt, 4 Cal. 3d 231, 481 P.2d 205 (1971); People v. Jackson,
23 111. 2d 360, 178 N.E.2d 320 (1961).
82. Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114, 119 (9th Cir. 1962).
83. People v. Redrick, 55 Cal. 2d 282, 287, 359 P.2d 255, 259 (1961).
489
Duquesne Law Review
in the group will use it even though it is present. To convict for
possession all persons present in a room or in a car where marijuana
is discovered would be a gross distortion of reality and of the standard
of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This reasoning is valid whether the drug is discovered at a party as
in Tirpak, a shared apartment as in Schuloif, or any other setting noted
in this article. Courts no longer will convict a person for possession of
drugs merely because he is present where drugs are being used or stored,
especially marijuana. Proof of possession may not be based on suspicion
or conjecture, but rather it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
MARK Louis GLOSSER
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